Domestic oil producers are feeling the pinch worst. Many
borrowed heavily to buy oilfields when crude was worth more than $100 a
barrel, and are now struggling to pay the interest on loans, says Kola
Karim, the founder of Shoreline Group, a Nigerian conglomerate. This, in
turn, threatens to create a banking crisis. About 20% of Nigerian
banks’ loans were made to oil and gas producers (along with another 4%
to underperforming power companies). Capital cushions are plumper than
they were during an earlier banking crisis in 2009; but, even so, bad
debts are mounting and banks that are exposed to oil producers may find
themselves in trouble. “It wouldn’t surprise me if one or two went
down,” says a senior banker in Nigeria.
The government’s response
to the crisis has been three-pronged. First, it is trying to stimulate
the economy with a mildly expansionary budget. At the same time, it is
trying to protect its dwindling hard-currency reserves by blocking
imports. Third, it is trying to suppress inflation by keeping the
currency, the naira, pegged at 197-199 to the dollar. Only the first of
these policies seems likely to work.
The budget, which includes a
plan to spend more on badly needed infrastructure, is a step in the
right direction. Although government revenues are under pressure from
the falling oil price, Mr Buhari hopes to offset that by plugging
“leakages” (a polite term for theft) and taxing people and businesses
more. That seems reasonable. At 7%, Nigeria’s tax-to-GDP ratio is
pitifully low. Every percentage point increase could yield $5 billion of
extra cash for the coffers, reckons Kayode Akindele of TIA Capital, an
investment firm. Mr Buhari also plans to save some $5 billion-$7 billion
a year by ending fuel subsidies—a crucial reform, if he sticks with it.
Even so he will be left with a deficit of $15 billion (3% of GDP) that
will have to be filled by domestic and foreign borrowing.
Yet his policies on the currency seem likely to stymie that.
The central bank has frozen the naira at its current overvalued
official rate for almost a year. The various import bans (on everything
from soap to ballpoint pens) are supposed to reduce demand for dollars,
but have little effect. Businesses that have to import essential
supplies to keep their factories running complain that they have been
forced into the black market, where the naira currently trades at 300 or
more to the dollar. Several local manufacturers have suspended
operations. International investors, knowing that the value of their
assets could tumble, have slammed on the brakes and some have pulled
money out of the country just as their dollars are most needed (see chart).
Nigeria is fortunate in having low levels of public debt (less than 20% of GDP), but
it is not helped by high interest rates, which mean that 35% of
government revenue goes straight out of the door again to service its
borrowings. It would not take much to push it into a debt crisis.
[/b]Frustratingly,[b]
this crunch is one that Nigeria has been through before—under the then
youthful Mr Buhari. Then, as now, he refused to let the market set the
value of the currency. Instead he shut out imports, causing the legal
import trade to fall by almost 50% and killing much of Nigeria’s nascent
industry in the process. Between 1980 and 1990, carmaking fell by
almost 90%. Today, as in the 1980s, the president is making a bad
situation worse.
http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21689584-cheap-oil-causing-currency-crisis-nigeria-banning-imports-no
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